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Perestroika initiated a period of renewed unrest in Chechnya. Chechen intellectuals began by attacking the officially-sponsored historian Vitaly Vinogradov's view that Chechnya had voluntarily joined Russia. In 1988, a proposal to build a biochemical plant in the town of Gudermes aroused widespread popular opposition. In summer 1988, a Chechen-Ingush Popular Front was formed, which rapidly progressed from ecological to political slogans. In June 1989, for the first time a Chechen, Doku Zavgaev, was elected first secretary of the Communist Party in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR.
Various civic action groups began to organize, and on November 23, 1990, a Chechen National Congress (CNC) was convened, with the consent and participation of Zavgaev. The Congress passed a resolution calling for the "sovereignty" of the Chechen-Ingush Republic and elected Jokhar Dudaev chairman of its Executive Committee.
Dudaev was born in a Chechen village in January 1944 and was deported with his family to Kazakhstan a few weeks later; he returned to Chechnya with his parents in 1957, pursued a successful military career, joined the Communist Party in 1966, and became a Major General in the Soviet air force. From 1987 to 1991 he commanded the strategic bomber group based in Tartu, Estonia, and from 1989, he commanded the garrison in that city. (In Estonia, he is still a popular hero because of his sympathetic attitude toward the Estonian national movement.) Early in 1991, after his election as chairman of the CNC executive committee, Dudaev retired from the Soviet air force. He is still listed as a major general in the reserves, and is legally entitled to a general's pension. He is married to a Russian, with whom he has three children (a son was wounded during the current fighting in Chechnya). Dudaev has been described as charismatic, intelligent, energetic, authoritarian, erratic, hotheaded, single- mindedly dedicated to the independence of Chechnya.
On November 27, 1990, prodded by the CNC's resolution, the Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR adopted a "Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Chechen-Ingush Republic." Since "sovereignty" was also proclaimed at this time by other Soviet Republics, the Chechen-Ingush declaration, which was endorsed by Zavgaev, did not cause particular concern, despite the implicit upgrade in status from that of Autonomous Republic within the Russian Federation.
In spring 1991 when the CNC again convened (June 8-9), the more radical faction was in the majority. In a speech to this Congress published in a Grozny newspaper, Dudaev declared that the Soviet Union and its instruments of colonial oppression -- the Communist Party, the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Procuracy -- had robbed the Chechen nation of its "religion, language, education, science, culture, natural resources, ideology, mass media, leadership cadres, and rights to freedom and life." He acknowledged that "the price of genuine sovereignty is great," but rejected proposals to accept diminished sovereignty in exchange for economic stability, asserting that it was absurd "to presume that the Chechens will ever be reconciled with their present miserly colonial freedom."
The CNC concluded its gathering by calling for early parliamentary and presidential elections, for adoption of a new consitution and a law on citizenship, and for a referendum on the Republic's status. The CNC set as prerequisites for signing a treaty with the USSR or Russia the unconditional recognition of the Chechen nation's right to independence, compensation for crimes committed against the Chechen nation, trials of the guilty, and establishment of a government based on democratic principles.
The actions of the CNC presented their neighbors the Ingush with a dilemma. Chechens and Ingush are related by ties of language, religion, and culture, and have been traditional allies, joined together under the Soviets in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. The Ingush, however, have tended to be less irreconcilable in their hostility to Russian influence.
In 1991 their chief concern was to regain ancestral territory to the west, the Prigorodny raion bordering Vladikavkaz. In 1944, when the Chechen and Ingush were deported, this region was transferred to the North Ossetin ASSR and it had not been returned to the Chechen-Ingush ASSR after its reconstitution in 1957. (The northern Naursky and Shelkovsky districts, however, were incorporated into the Chechen-Ingush ASSR for the first time in 1957.) On April 26, 1991, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet passed a Law on the Rehabilitation of the Repressed Peoples promising in Article 6 "the restoration of the frontiers of their national territories existing before the frontiers were changed by anti-Constitutional force." The Law also provided for a discretionary transitional period before implementation of this provision.
Ingush leaders believed that their claims to Prigorodny raion could best be achieved by remaining within the Russian Federation. The June 1991 meeting of the CNC suggested that the Ingush decide their own political status and determine their relationship to Chechnya by a referendum. On September 15, 1991, an assembly of Ingush deputies passed a resolution calling for the formation of an "Ingush Autonomous Republic within the RSFSR." A referendum conducted (November 30-December 1, 1991) in three predominantly Ingush districts approved the proposed separation from Chechnya.
The Ingush decision was accepted by Dudaev and his followers. It was in effect confirmed by the RF Supreme Soviet on June 4, 1992, when it adopted a law "On the Creation of the Ingush Republic in the Russian Federation." This law failed, however, to fix the boundaries of the newly established Ingush Republic, providing instead in Article 5 that a Russian Federation government commission should consult with all parties concerned and propose a solution for the frontier issue by December 31, 1993. The failure to resolve promptly the question of Prigorodny rayon led to fighting between Ossetins and Ingush in October 1992, with several hundred people killed and many homes destroyed, the expulsion of almost all Ingush from Vladikavkaz and Prigorodny rayon, and the establishment by the Russian Federation of a state of emergency administration for the affected region.
General Ruslan Aushev, president of Ingushetia, and Boris Agapov, vice-president, have tried to keep Ingushetia out of the current war in Chechnya, while at the same time serving as a constructive intermediaries for the opposing parties.
Political passions continued to heat up in Chechnya during the summer of 1991. They boiled over following the failed August 19-21 coup attempt by reactionary forces in Moscow. Zavgaev was then in Moscow to sign the proposed Union treaty. Almost all officials in Grozny either favored the putschists or avoided taking sides by calling in sick.
In contrast, on August 19, Dudaev and the CNC Executive Committee issued a decree denouncing the plotters as "a group of government criminals," appealed to "the population of the Chechen Republic to show perseverance, determination, and courage in defending democracy and human dignity," and called for "a campaign of civil disobedience." Large demonstrations in Grozny's main square supported Dudaev and the CNC. Zavgaev, who returned from Moscow on August 21, and the official establishment in Chechnya never regained control of the situation in Chechnya; on August 22 Dudaev's followers seized the Grozny television station; on August 24 they pulled down Lenin's statue in the town center; by the end of August a national guard was formed; on September 1-2 the third session of the CNC passed a resolution transferring power in Chechnya to its Executive Committee; and on September 6 the National Guard stormed a meeting of the Chechen-Ingush Supreme Soviet, forced Zavgaev to sign an "act of abdication," and manhandled and dispersed the deputies. In the melee, Vitaly Kutsenko, the first secretary of the Communist Party City Committee, jumped from a third-floor window and died as a result of his injuries.
The leaders of the Russian Federation, having defeated the attempted coup and now striving to replace the disintegrating administrative structures of the USSR, sought to assert their authority over the Chechen-Ingush Republic. On August 26, Aslanbek Aslakhanov, a Chechen, a general in the Ministry of Interior, and chair of the Russian Supreme Soviet's Committee on Legality and Public Order, was sent down to Grozny; he urged Zavgaev and the authorities, who were still recognized by Moscow, to refrain from the use of force in dealing with civil disobedience.
On September 11, Gennady Burbulis and Mikhail Poltoranin were dispatched from Moscow by the Russian Republic's leadership to try and restore order. On September 14, Ruslan Khasbulatov, a Chechen elected in 1990 to the RF Supreme Soviet from Grozny and its acting chairman after June 1991, arrived in Grozny to broker a deal among the conflicting forces. In an interview on September 7, he had called Zavgaev a tool of Moscow and a supporter of the putsch. On September 15, at a special session of the Chechen-Ingush Supreme Soviet, he persuaded the deputies to remove Zavgaev and to disband, in anticipation of new parliamentary elections, which were set for November 17. A 32-member Provisional Council, drawn from various political factions, was appointed to exercise executive power in the interim. Nevertheless, the political struggle between the radical nation-alist forces, grouped around Dudaev and pushing for independence, and the conservative establishment, trying to preserve the status quo, continued.
The Provisional Council, unwieldy and divided, split into competing blocs, and the CNC declared that elections for parliament and a president would be held on October 27.On October 6-7, General Alexander Rutskoi, then Vice-President of Russia, accompanied by Andrei Dunaev, RF Minister of Internal Affairs, and Viktor Ivanenko, chairman of the RF KGB, visited Grozny and met with Dudaev and representatives of the different factions contending for power. Rutskoi, on his return to Moscow, reported to the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet that Georgia's President, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, was behind the unrest in Chechnya, and that Dudaev's "gang", which was terrorizing the population, numbered only 250 men.
On October 8, the Presidium of the RF Supreme Soviet adopted a Resolution on the Political Situation in the Chechen-Ingush Republic, which expressed "serious concern regarding the situation in the Chechen-Ingush Republic" where "the escalation of violent actions by illegal formations is continuing" and "the life, rights, and property of citizens of the Chechen-Ingush Republic are subect to growing danger." The Presidium then declared that the Provisional Council was the only legitimate state power in the Republic, that this Provisional Council should take all necessary measures to stabilize the situation, that "illegal armed formations" should hand in their weapons by midnight October 10, and that the forthcoming elections should be held on the basis of the Russian Federation's existing legislation.
On October 9, speaking on Russian television, General Rutskoi called the CNC Executive Committee members "criminals." His attacks were seconded by Khasbulatov, who assured the Supreme Soviet that the overwhelming majority of the Chechen people wanted to remain in the Federation. On October 19, President Yeltsin ordered all in Chechnya to submit to the terms of the Resolution of October 8 within three days.Dudaev in response announced mobilization and expansion of the Chechen National Guard; 50,000 persons demonstrated in his support in Grozny. Elections were held on October 27, the date proposed by the CNC, and, according to Andrei Illarionov's and Boris Lvin's article "Should Russia recognize Chechnya's Indpendence?" (Moscow News, no. 8, 1995), 458,144 persons (72% of the eligible voters) participated. Running against three competitors for the presidency, Dudaev received 412,671 votes (90% of the ballots cast). Several candidates had withdrawn, complaining of unfair election practices.
The Russian authorities refused to recognize the election as valid, claiming that only 15% of eligible voters participated and that existing legislation had not been respected. Now it was the turn for groups opposing Dudaev to demonstrate in Grozny, and in December, Umar Avturkhanov, an officer in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the recently elected mayor of the Nadterechny Raion in the north of Chechnya, announced that he would not obey Grozny's commands. On November 7, President Yeltsin declared a state of emergency in the Chechen-Ingush Republic. The newly-elected Chechen parliament responded by voting emergency powers to Dudaev, who ordered martial law in Chechnya and mobilized the National Guard. When planes carrying Russian troops landed at the airport near Grozny, their deployment was blocked by Chechen forces.
On November 10, the RF Supreme Soviet voted to withhold the confirmation required by Russian law for prolongation of Yeltsin's state of emergency decree. Probably the dominant factor in the Supreme Soviet's decision was a reluctance to use the Russian army to intervene in a domestic political dispute, a reluctance reinforced by the recent August events in Moscow. The Russian troops were evacuated from Grozny airport in what was regarded as a defeat for the Chechen policy of Rutskoi, Khasbulatov, and Yeltsin.It is interesting how events in Grozny during fall 1991 reflected and often seemed to anticipate analogous events in Moscow.
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